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ABSTRACT

EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL R&D SPENDING
ON PATENT REGISTRATION: A NASA CASE STUDY

Jack Davis
Economics Department
Bachelor of Science

This paper examines the question of what impact federal R&D spending has on
patent registration and future technological innovation. Because the causal relationship
between federal R&D and patent grants is difficult to determine given aggregate trends
and endogeneity, I use the sharp changes in NASA R&D funding between 1959 and 1975
as an interrupted time series. These unique circumstances, caused by the Space Race,
make this time period a valuable event study in which to consider the impact of federal
R&D. 1,996 unique patents granted to NASA and NASA-affiliates are considered, as
well as an additional 19,845 unique patents which cite one or more of the original NASA
patents. Regressing data from this interrupted time series, I find a significant and positive
impact of NASA R&D appropriations on patent grants from 1959 to 1975, as well as on
future innovation in both the public and private sector.
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I.

Introduction
Central to the debate regarding the economic role of the public sector are

questions about the impact and effectiveness of publicly funded innovation. In response
to these inquiries, a growing number of economists are examining the macroeconomic
impact of government research and development (R&D) spending on innovation and
growth in the aggregate economy. Some economists have asserted that public sector
R&D funding crowds out private sector investment, or, at the very least, has a negligible
impact on improving private sector productivity (Levy and Terleckyj 1983). A number of
more recent examinations, however, assert that government R&D funding plays a
significant role in stimulating private R&D and private sector efficiency (Becker 2015;
Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017). Indeed, U.S. federal R&D spending has been shown to
increase aggregate economic output as well as increase the productivity of technological
advancement in the private sector (Campbell and Shirley 2018). If this is true, it would
imply that publically funded R&D has a spillover effect that is not accounted for when
considering the direct cost of the investment. Understanding this potential spillover of
publicly funded R&D is vital to any consideration of the optimal level of federal R&D.
The answers to these questions are vital components of many U.S. public policy
debates. Federal R&D as a percent of GDP has fallen from 1.2% in 1976 to 0.7% in
2018.1 At the same time, however, overall R&D is on the rise—in 2015 total U.S. R&D
spending reached an all-time high of $499 billion, and nearly 70% of that spending was

1

American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Historical Trends in Federal R&D,”
https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd
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done by the private sector.2 This milestone, however, also marked the lowest share of
federal R&D (as a percentage of total R&D) that has even been recorded. Given these
trends, it is more important than ever to examine the effectiveness of publically funded
R&D.
This paper aims to consider the question of what impact federal R&D has on
patent registration, and what impact those patents have on future innovation. I do this by
reviewing a specific case study: U.S. federal government R&D spending at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) from 1959 to 1975. Because of the Space
Race, which peaked in 1969 when American astronauts landed on the Moon, the U.S.
federal government allocated hundreds of billions of dollars for R&D at NASA. Such a
rapid and anomalous funding spike—and subsequent funding decrease—in federal R&D
provides an insightful opportunity to examine the impact of federal R&D spending on
overall innovation. This period at NASA presents itself as a valuable event study.
I seek to address the question of federal R&D effectiveness through a review of
NASA and NASA-affiliated patents granted from 1959 to 1975, as well as all future
patents that cite these original patents. Although an imperfect measure of innovation,
patent data act as a useful variable to determine the effectiveness of R&D initiatives.
Likewise, patent citation data offer a useful measure of the impact a single invention has
on later innovation (Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks 1998). By examining what happened to
patent registration at NASA as well as the number of patents citing NASA patents after

2

American Institute of Physics, “US R&D Spending at All-Time High, Federal Share Reaches
Record Low,” 8 Nov 2016, https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/us-rd-spending-all-time-high-federalshare-reaches-record-low
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the sudden increase in NASA R&D funding, I provide insight into what impact Space
Race R&D funding had on present and future economic innovation.
The aim of this paper is not to quantify the economic impact of federal R&D
spending on the larger economy or prove a causal relationship between the two; the
number of factors driving overall innovation and patent registration are beyond the scope
of a single event study. That said, the circumstances surrounding the Space Race of the
1960s make NASA a valuable case study nonetheless. The exogenous shock to
innovation, prompted by Space Race-era funding, provides compelling evidence for a
causal relationship between federal R&D funding and overall innovation.
Both empirical and anecdotal evidence from this case study shows that there is a
strongly correlated and positive relationship between R&D spending and patent
registration. Even after accounting for potential concerns such as autocorrelation and
omitted variable bias, regression analysis provides strong evidence for a causal
relationship between federal R&D and patent grants. This relationship, in turn, has a
significant impact on future patent citations (and, by extension overall U.S. innovation
and economic growth). Federal R&D spending at NASA from 1959 to 1975 lead to the
creation of 1,996 unique patents in a number of fields—these federally funded patents
then facilitated future innovation and were at least partially responsible for an additional
19,845 patents in the ensuing decades.

3

II. Publically Funded R&D
a.

Overview and Historical Trends
The U.S. federal government has long been involved in various R&D efforts. In

the 1840s, the federal government founded both the Smithsonian Institution and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science as a way to increase government
involvement in science and technology. This involvement continued to increase
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, with the establishment of the National Academy of
Science and the National Institutes of Health.
Federal involvement in R&D increased dramatically during and after World War
II as defense and atomic research received billions of dollars of federal funding. These
initiatives changed the landscape of American R&D and made the federal government a
key player in that research.

Figure 1: R&D as a Percent of the Federal Budget: FY1962-2017. Source: AAAS
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Attitudes toward federal R&D, however, have shifted in more recent decades.
Increasing concerns about U.S. budget deficits and an increased reliance on the private
sector have resulted in lower levels of federal R&D funding. The President’s FY2018
budget request, for instance, includes $117.679 billion for R&D, a 20.6% decrease from
FY2016 (Sargent 2018). Figure 1 illustrates this decline in federal R&D. Current political
rhetoric and policy proposals in Congress indicate that federal R&D levels will continue
to fall.
Federal R&D is primarily conducted in two ways: federal contracts and federal
grants. Federal contracts describe the more traditional form of federal R&D and includes
research done at or through a federally funded laboratory—examples would include
discoveries made by federally funded scientists at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Department of Energy, or NASA. Increasingly, however, federal R&D
funds are being allocated as grants to non-governmental entities such as private research
labs and higher education institutions. Economists disagree as to whether direct or
indirect R&D is more effective at spurring innovation, and evidence has shown different
approaches to have varying levels of effectiveness in different settings (Tassey 1996).
This paper examines only a direct R&D approach during the Space Race, although
additional study to compare the effectiveness of direct and indirect R&D would be
valuable to addressing the question of federal R&D.

b.

Literature Review
Economists have long studied the effectiveness of publicly funded R&D and the

interaction between public and private R&D spending. Salter and Martin’s (2001) review
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of the current literature finds that there is little consensus among economists; the
literature highlights both numerous benefits and drawbacks of publicly funded R&D.
One of the first rigorous examinations of public R&D was conducted by Richard
Nelson in 1959. He examines R&D initiatives from the preceding decades in an effort to
qualitatively determine whether the United States was achieving the socially optimal
level of research, based on the economic value of that research. He concludes that while
private firms can get close to an optimal level of R&D, the U.S. free market system
prevents the social benefits of R&D from being reflected in private profit, as many of the
social benefits and positive externalities are not quantified in dollars.
Kenneth Arrow’s “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention” (1962) adds to this conclusion by constructing a basic framework for
considering questions of public R&D. Optimal invention and innovation, Arrow points
out, will happen only under conditions of perfect competition. Yet the market for
invention is full of market failures: indivisibility, inappropriability, and uncertainty are
among the most important that Arrow highlights. Given this reality, economists since
have thus asserted that public R&D is necessary to correct for these market failures.
One common concern, however, is that public R&D will either partially or totally
crowd out private efforts and hurt private sector effectiveness. Busom (2000) conducts an
empirical analysis of public R&D subsidies and finds that in some cases, firms would
have allocated more to R&D had the government not contributed. For some firms in the
study though, public spending actually raised private R&D investment by as much as
20%. A review of econometric literature from the past 35 years similarly finds that in
some cases, public R&D acts as a complement to private R&D while in others it acts as a

6

substitute (Davis, Hall, and Toole 2000). That said, there is little consensus in the
literature as to which effect prevails.
Some more recent studies highlight the potential benefits of R&D. Prettner and
Werner (2016) analyze the growth and welfare effects of research and show that the
optimal level of R&D is far higher than the current average OECD rate. They explain this
disparity, in part, by highlighting the substantial fixed costs of basic research as well
showing the difficulty firms have in quantifying many of the benefits. An increase in
public R&D investments could be a way to overcome initial fixed costs and raise social
welfare in the medium- and long-run.
Ultimately, the past and current literature provides a mixed message on the
effectiveness of publicly funded R&D. While there are demonstrable benefits to growth
and welfare that come from federal R&D, there are also risks that public R&D crowds
out private sector investment and leads to a less than optimal outcome.

III. NASA: History and Budget Overview
NASA was established in 1958 to replace the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics. This new agency was established with the mission to peacefully explore
space and establish methods for spaceflight. In its first year of operation, NASA’s total
funding was $732 million, or just 0.1% of the federal budget3.

3

All dollar figures given are in 2018 dollars.
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Figure 2: R&D as a Percent of Discretionary Spending: FY1962-FY2018. Note the spike
in funding that peaks in 1966 as a result of the Space Race. Source: AAAS.

The founding of NASA, however, corresponded with the start of the Space Race
between the United States and Soviet Union—this technological and political rivalry
prompted the U.S. federal government to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on R&D in
the fields of aeronautics, engineering, chemistry, and more. While the 1959 appropriation
for NASA R&D was less than $2 billion, that figure soon expanded significantly.
Following President John F. Kennedy’s “We choose to go to the Moon” speech in late
1962, NASA R&D funding increased dramatically, and by 1966, had risen to more than
$35 billion. This constituted a major and sudden shift in federal funds; NASA’s budget
accounted for 0.2% of the federal budget in 1959 and 4.41% of the federal budget in
1966. By 1975, NASA’s budget fell again to represent only 0.98% of the federal budget.
Space Race R&D funding represents, by far, the largest increase and subsequent decrease
in federal R&D spending in modern history (see figure 2 and note the Space Race
8

induced funding trend from 1962 to 1974). This reality, in part, makes the Space Race an
ideal event study when considering the impact of federal R&D. In the past decade NASA
funding has settled to about $19.5 billion, or 0.5% of the federal budget.
Between 1959 and 1975, NASA's budget was divided into three accounts:
research and development, research and program management, and construction of
facilities. These accounts received appropriations each year from Congress and varied
widely during the 17-year period this paper considers.
R&D is defined by NASA to include “research, development, operations,
services, minor construction maintenance, repair, and alteration of real and personal
property; and purchase, hire, maintenance, and operation of other than administrative
aircraft necessary for the conduct and support of aeronautical and space research and
development activities..."4 As such, NASA's R&D account supported a large number of
activities related to space exploration, aeronautical research, mechanical, electrical, and
chemical engineering improvements, and more.
Between 1959 and 1975, the federal government appropriated more than $317
billion (2018 dollars) for R&D at NASA. This funding pattern corresponds closely to the
Space Race of the 1960s; R&D funding peaked in 1966 at $35 billion, and, nine years
later in 1975, once the space race had subsided, fell to less than a third of that. Figure 3
summarizes these appropriations in R&D and other categories.

4

NASA, "Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 1970," vol. 1, "Summary Data," 1969
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Figure 3: Summary of NASA Appropriations: FY1959-FY1975 (figures are given in
millions of 2018 dollars)

IV. Patents and Patent Citations
a.

Background and Use in Economics
A patent is a grant of a property right to an inventor issued by the United States

Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The right conferred by a patent is “the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the
United States or “importing” the invention into the United States from abroad.5 These
grants are temporary, generally lasting no more than 20 years, after which time the
invention may be used, produced, or sold by any individual or firm. There are about 2.1
million patents currently in force in the United States and more than 10 million registered
5

United States Patent and Trademark Office, “General information concerning patents”
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with the USPTO. Patent data has been largely digitized and is available for use from the
USPTO and other third-party sources.
The USPTO issues three types of patents:
1. Utility patent: a grant for any discovery of a new or useful process, machine,
article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof;
2. Design patent: a grant for any discovery of a new, original, and ornamental
design for an article of manufacture; and
3. Plant patent: a grant for any discovery of an asexually reproduced, distinct
variety of plant.
Nearly all NASA patents considered in this paper are utility and design patents, as are the
patents considered in the citations.
All patent documents contain three dates corresponding to different steps of the
patent application process: the priority date, the earliest date to which an inventor can
claim exclusivity of an invention; the filing date, the date on which filing with the
USPTO is completed; and the grant date, the date on which an inventor is granted a
patent by the USPTO. Patents examined in this paper are shown with their grant date—as
a result, most patents represent inventions made a number of years prior to the
application date. One of NASA's first patents, for example, was filed in late 1959 but not
granted until 1965.
In addition to information regarding the invention, patent documentation also
contains citation data. Patent citations “indicate previously existing knowledge, embodied
in prior patents or other publications, upon which the patent builds” (Jaffe 1997). One
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patent may cite any number of previous patents to indicate their importance to the new
invention. These citations provide useful information about what prior knowledge
inventors drew on for their patent. Citations, in many ways, allow economists and others
to trace the trail of innovation, both forward and backward in time.
Economists have long used patent data as a measure of innovation and economic
growth (Schmookler 1966; Griliches 1984 and 1990; Jaffe 1986). Although not perfectly
representative, these instances of invention can act as a variable to measure new
innovation and help indicate the overall innovative power of an economy. Patent data are
also readily available; today, patent information can be easily accessed through the
USPTO, Google Patents, and other third-party internet sites. The availability of millions
of records on innovation and invention have been, and continue to be, a powerful
resource for economists.
There are certainly drawbacks from using patents to measure the impact of R&D,
including the fact that patents represent far more than simply financial investment—new
invention is influenced by a multitude of social and economic factors not captured in
appropriations data. Likewise, patent citations may not accurately represent the spillover
effect of a patent. In patent documentation citations are all given equally, so it is
impossible to determine the extent to which a past patent influenced the invention. A
patent citing a past NASA patent, for example, could be drawing on just a small piece of
that original knowledge and might have been invented without the influence of the
original patent.
These concerns notwithstanding, patents are still the most feasible way to
represent the impact of federal R&D in an event study like this. Not only are they readily
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available, but they are a consistent source of data across the decades. Additionally,
patents represent society’s best effort at quantifying knowledge and turning it into a
marketable commodity. As such, it is a valuable tool for economists.
In this case study I make a number of broad assumptions concerning patents: that
(1) my sample of 1,996 NASA patents is representative of all NASA patents granted
between 1959 and 1975; (2) that patent grants represent discoveries made 4 years prior
(see “A Note on NASA Patents” for more details on this assumption); and (3) that patent
and patent citations are a generally representative measure of innovation in a given
sector.

b.

A Note on NASA Patents
Throughout its history, NASA has conducted research and made discoveries

through both NASA laboratories and NASA-affiliated private contractors. To
accommodate this public-private partnership and clarify patent ownership, the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was written to include the following provision:
Whenever any invention is made in the performance of any work under any
contract of the [NASA] Administration . . . [the] invention shall be the exclusive
property of the United States, and if such invention is patentable a patent therefor
shall be issued to the United States upon application made by the Administrator.6
As a result, NASA patents may be filed under the name of the Administrator of NASA or
under the name of the original inventor, if invented by a private contractor. In either case,

6

National Aeronautics and Space Act (1958) Sec. 305. (a) and (2)
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however, the patent in owned in full by the government of the United States. The NASA
sample of 1,996 patents considered by this paper contain a mix of these two types.
NASA patents—like all other patents—are officially granted some time after a
discovery is actually made. In order to account for this, I make the broad assumption that
patent grants represent discoveries made, on average, 4 years earlier. An analysis of 642
NASA discoveries made between 1959 and 1969 shows that the average time between
the priority date and the grant date is 3.9 years with a standard deviation of 5.4 years. The
minimum difference in this sample is 0.6 years while the maximum is 16.3 years. This
assumption allows me to present the relationship between funding and patent grants more
clearly. That said, such an assumption certainly carries the risk of misrepresenting when a
discovery was made.

V.

Data
Data for this paper were gathered from the USPTO patent database, Google

Patent, the NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS), and the NASA Historical Series
Data Books, volumes I and II.
The compilation of funding data is straightforward—as a public government
agency, NASA publishes detailed financial reports at the end of each fiscal year,
including details on what appropriations were used for R&D. Figures in NASA historical
records are shown in nominal dollars, and in this paper all dollar values are shown in real
2018 constant dollars.
Patent data, while also readily available, are more complex to gather and compile.
I use the USPTO database and the NTRS to determine the number of patents registered
14

by NASA and NASA-affiliates from 1959 to 1975; through these sources, I can identify
1,996 total patents. This figure is consistent with previous estimates of NASA patent
grants from that time period and with overall estimates of federally funded patents (Jaffe,
Fogarty, and Banks 1997). That said, I cannot preclude the possibility that some NASA
and NASA-affiliated patents may have been missed. As such, the 1,996 NASA patents
utilized in this paper should be considered a highly representative sample rather than an
exhaustive list.
Patent citation information was gathered from Google Patent for each of the 1996
NASA patents. This yielded 19,845 unique patents. Again, I cannot preclude the
possibility that some citations were missed, and as such, the 19,845 citation patents
utilized in this paper should be considered a highly representative sample rather than an
exhaustive list. If I have missed any patent citations, however, this would suggest that my
estimates are biased downward, and that the effects are potentially larger that shown in
this paper. Patents in this sample of 19,845 contain ones owned by both government
agencies and private sector entities.
Despite the large number of patents considered in this paper, the time series
sample size is relatively small—the exogenous change to funding caused by the Space
Race lasted just over a decade. Additionally, I measure annual patent grants, rather than
monthly or quarterly in an attempt to match the frequency of the funding data. As a
result, my time series data contains just 16 observations (one for each year). This sample
size should be taken into consideration when discussing results or drawing any
conclusions from the data.
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VI. Methods
To answer the question of what effect federal R&D has on patent grants, one
could run the simple regression of patent grants per year on federal R&D funding per
year:
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠' = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔' + 𝑢'
where patentst is the number of unique federal patent grants, fundingt is the amount of
federal R&D funding allocated, and ut is an error term. The coefficient β1 in this model
would be interpreted as the number of federal patents produced by an increase in federal
R&D funding. Assuming a four-year lag between funding and the patent grant, one could
run the same regression with funding lagged by four years, substituting fundingt-4 for
fundingt.
Additionally, if interested in the effect of federal R&D on future citations, one
could run a similar, simple regression of citation patents on federal R&D funding in a
given year:
𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠' = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔' + 𝑢'
where citationst is the number of unique patents citing federal patents, fundingt is the
amount of federal R&D funding allocated in a given year, t, and ut is an error term. The
coefficient β1 in this model would be interpreted as the number of future patents produced
by an increase in federal R&D funding. Again, with the same assumption regarding
funding and innovation, one could run the same regression with lagged funding,
substituting fundingt-4 for fundingt.
These regressions, however, are likely to pick up aggregate trends in innovation
and federal R&D; there are a number of significant factors which influence R&D and
16

innovation and the above regressions will suffer from omitted variable bias and produce
an unreliable estimator. Additionally, there are likely to be problems of endogeneity as
well—overall rates of innovation probably impact trends in federal R&D funding, and
visa versa.
Because of these potential issues, I focus on one specific case study in which
there was a large, exogenous increase in federal R&D funding at NASA due to the Space
Race. This sharp change in federal R&D funding creates a valuable interrupted time
series. In the absence of randomization or a randomized control trial, analysis of an
interrupted time series is arguably the best approach to determining the impact of an
intervention (Kontopantelis, Springate, Buchan, and Reeves 2015). The intervention, in
this case, is federal R&D funding.
Given my interrupted time series, I will examine the impact of federal R&D on
patents grants using the following regression:
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠' = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔' + 𝑢'
where patentst is the number of unique NASA patent grants in a given year, t, fundingt is
the amount of NASA R&D funding received in the same year, t, and ut is an error term.
The coefficient β1 in this regression can be interpreted as the number of patents produced
by an additional one million dollars of federal R&D funding received in the same year.
Assuming, however, that patents grants occur four years after the actual innovation, I will
also regress on fundingt-4, the amount of NASA R&D funding received four years
previous. In this lagged regression, the coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the number of
patents produced by an additional one million dollars of federal R&D funding received
four years previous. This estimation will provide valuable insight into the question at
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hand, as R&D funding during this event study is driven by an exogenous shock rather
than an aggregate trend.
Turning to patent citations, I start by estimating the effect of 1959-1975 federal
R&D funding on future patents which cite an original NASA patent:
𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠' = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔'45 + 𝑢'
where citationst is the number of patent grants which cite a NASA patent from a given
year, t, fundingt is the amount of original lagged NASA R&D funding received, and ut is
an error term. The coefficient β1 in this regression can be interpreted as the number of
patents which cite a NASA patent produced by increases in federal R&D funding during
the event study.
I then compute a similar regression, instead estimating the effect of 1959-1975
NASA patents on future patents:
𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠' = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠' + 𝑢'
where citationst is the number of patent grants which cite a NASA patent in a given year,
t, patentst is the number of original NASA patent grants, and ut is an error term. The
coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the number of patents which cite a NASA patent
produced by an increase in original NASA patents.
I rerun the two preceding citation regressions, estimating the log number of
citations rather than the total number of citations:
log (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠' ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔'45 + 𝑢'
log (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠' ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠' + 𝑢'
Using the log number of citations allows me to measure the impact of funding and
original patent increases as a percent change rather than an absolute change. The
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coefficients in these regressions, β1, can thus be interpreted as the percent increase in
patent citations resulting from an increase in $1 million of R&D funding or one
additional NASA patent, respectively.
Because of problems of endogeneity that arise when using patents as both the
endogenous and exogenous variable, however, I will also estimate the impact using an
instrumental variables (IV) strategy; I use NASA R&D funding as the instrument. In
order for it to be considered a valid instrument, it must meet two conditions: relevance
and exclusion. Relevance is met, as I am able to show a strong correlation between
NASA R&D funding and NASA patents. Exclusions is slightly more difficult. The notion
that NASA R&D funding only effects future patents through original NASA patents—
while certainly plausible—might not be completely true. That said, I nonetheless use
funding as an instrument with the assumption that any direct relationship between NASA
R&D funding and future patents is insignificant.
This regression, together with the others, illustrates the relationship between R&D
funding, NASA patents, and future patent citations. There are number of problems,
however, that can arise in such regressions.
Autocorrelation could bias the standard errors and lead to inaccurate conclusions,
as federal R&D funding in one year is likely correlated to funding in both the previous
and next year. This first-order autocorrelation, however, is likely reduced by the fact that
the sudden and exogenous nature of the Space Race was the primary determinant of
funding during this case study. I utilize a Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey LM test
in the “Robustness” section of this paper to test autocorrelation. Although autocorrelation
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likely exists, the unique circumstances of the Space Race help to negate it in a way that
would not been seen during typical periods of federal appropriations.
Additionally, this regression potentially suffers from omitted variable bias. R&D
funding is likely to be just one variable that impacts patent registration: overall education
levels, economic growth, employment in STEM fields, the ability to share scientific
information, general attitudes toward science, and more all likely play a role in
determining the number of patents granted in a given year. If these trends are correlated
with changes in federal R&D funding, my regression will produce a biased estimator; in
the “Robustness” section of this paper I examine these omitted variables and their impact
on the estimation.

VII. Findings
a.

NASA Funding and Patents: Trends and Analysis
During the period considered by this paper, NASA and NASA affiliates were

granted at least 1,996 unique patents. Figure 4 summarizes the years in which these
patents were granted. NASA patent grants increased from its founding until it peaked in
1971 with 322 unique patents. Following 1971, patent grants steadily decreased.
Figure 5 shows the total number of U.S. patent grants, minus NASA patents,
received from 1963 to 1975. The figure shows a steady increase in total patents grants
throughout the event study, indicating that NASA patent grants were not likely crowding
out private patent growth. One of the most common concerns with publicly funded R&D
is that it crowds out private sector involvement and reduces overall efficiency; this data
helps to mitigate some of those concerns.
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Figure 4: Summary of NASA Patents: 1959-1975. (Year given is the patent grant year,
not the priority year.)

Figure 5: Total U.S. patent grants, minus NASA patents: 1963-1975.
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When viewed together, trends in R&D funding and patent grants appear to have a
clear and positive relationship. Figures 5 and 6 show this relationship graphically, with
funding in figure 6 shifted by four years to represent the lag between an invention and
patent grant. When accounting for the lag between discoveries and patent grants, years
with increased R&D funding correspond closely to years with increased patent grants.
Even without the use of any econometric tools or regression estimations, the data
illustrate a clear relationship between funding and patent grants.

Figure 6: Summary of NASA patent grants and R&D appropriations: FY1959-FY1975.
(Figures are given in millions of 2018 constant dollars.)
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Figure 7: Summary of NASA patent grants and R&D appropriations shifted by four
years: FY1959-FY1975. (Figures are given in millions of 2018 constant dollars.)

Not only do the increases in R&D funding seem to correspond to increases in
patent grants but decreases in R&D funding seem to correspond to patent grant decreases
as well. This is a significant observation. Some assert that the role of federal R&D is
primarily in overcoming high fixed costs (Prettner and Werner 2016). By extension, it
would be reasonable to think that patent grants simply correlated to NASA's existence
rather than the specific level of NASA R&D funding. Were this the case however, patent
grants would increase as funding increased, and then stay fairly consistent in their new
steady state. The observed data suggest otherwise; patent grants increase as R&D funding
increases and fall as R&D funding decreases. A regression is used to show this
empirically.
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I first regress original NASA patents on funding changes to find the aggregate
impact of funding on patent grants. This regression generates a statistically insignificant
result (See table 1 for regression statistics).

Table 1: Output statistics for regression of NASA patents on funding with no lag.

When original NASA patents are regressed on lagged funding however, the
results change and the coefficient becomes significant at a 95% confidence level (table 2
summarizes these regression results with funding lagged by four years).

Table 2: Output statistics for regression of NASA patents on funding with a four year lag.

In contrast to the non-lagged regression, a regression using funding lagged by four years
gives a coefficient that is both statistically significant and more applicable to the question
at hand. This regression shows that changes in funding four years previous were
positively correlated with changes in patent grants, and that, on average, increasing R&D
funding by one million dollars lead to 0.085 new patent grants. Alternatively, this
estimator indicates that it cost $11.8 million to create one new patent four years in the
future. Additionally, an R-squared of 0.46 implies that an important amount of the
change in patent grants can be attributed to changes in funding.
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One important aspect of public R&D missed by this regression is the impact of
fixed costs. Prettner and Werner (2016) highlight the substantial fixed costs involved in
basic research, and NASA is no exception; from its establishment in 1958 to the peak of
Space Race funding in 1966, NASA spent billions of dollars to build facilities, hire
researchers, and establish an effective system of R&D. In fact, between 1959 and 1975,
NASA spent $25.7 billion dollars on just the construction of facilities. These and other
expenses constitute substantial fixed costs.
It is entirely reasonable to think that the impact of R&D funding, therefore,
changed over time during the event study. An additional $1 million of R&D appropriated
in 1959 might be used, in large part, to overcome initial fixed costs, while later R&D
appropriations could used for more direct research. Thus, the regression in table 2
represents the aggregate impact of R&D funding from 1959 to 1975 and does not indicate
the effectiveness of this funding in relation to fixed costs.

b.

Patent Citations: Trends and Analysis
23 of the original 1,996 NASA patents are not cited by any future patents. The

remaining 1,973 patents are all cited by later patents; the mean number of citations per
NASA patent is 11.3 with a standard deviation of 13.5. The minimum number of citations
is one while the maximum is 158. This suggests that some NASA patents produced far
more innovation than others. These citation figures are summarized in table 3. In total,
NASA’s original 1,973 patents are the basis for 22,360 future citations.
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Table 3: Summary of citation statistics for 1959-1975 NASA patents.

NASA’s 1,973 cited patents are the basis for 19,845 future unique patents,
implying that one NASA patent, on average, is at least partially responsible for roughly
10.1 future patents. While these future patents contain both public and private patents, we
can estimate the proportion based on past patent studies, as well as observe it from the
data. Jaffe (1998) concludes that, on average, federal patents constitute about 3% of all
patents. A back of the envelope calculation using this figure implies that of the 19,845
patents citing NASA patents, about 600 are owned by the federal government.
From my own sample of 19,845 patents, I find at least 704 (or about 3.5%) of
them to be registered to a federal agency.7 Thus, NASA’s original patents are at least
partially responsible for 704 government patents and 19,141 private patents (summarized
in figure 8). It would appear that the great majority of publicly funded patents produced
by NASA lead to innovation in the private sector, rather than in the public sector,
indicating a spillover effect.

7

I find this figure by excluding all patents from the data which have, in the name of the assignee,
terms including “Government of the United States,” “representing the government of the United
States,” “United States of America,” “United States Department of,” “Department of Defense,”
and “NASA.”
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Figure 8: Summary of distribution of public versus private patents citing original NASA
patents.

Based on date of the citations, I additionally find that citations to original NASA
patents are distributed fairly evenly over the decades following the publications of the
original patents (see figure 9 for the summary). This suggests that original NASA patents
have continued to promote innovation, even more than five decades after their original
publication. Figure 10 illustrates the number of patent citations by the year of the original
NASA patent cited. This figure indicates that future patents cite original patents that were
granted throughout the 16-year period.
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Figure 9: Summary of citations by grant year, 1959-2019.

Figure 10: Summary of citations by year of original patent, 1959-1975.
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Figure 11: Summary of the distribution of patent citations across time, by year of original
patents.
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Figure 11 explores this distribution of patent citations in greater detail. The
thirteen graphs show the years in which ‘future patents’ were granted, based on the year
of the original NASA patent which they cite. There is no uniform distribution across
time; while some years see a spike in citations just after the grant of the original NASA
patent, future citations are generally distributed uniformly throughout the proceeding
decades. This again illustrates the innovative power of NASA patents across time.
Turning to the regressions of patent citations, I compute regressions similar to
those used for original NASA patents. First, regressing the number of citations on the
original lagged funding produces a statistically insignificant correlation, summarized in
table 5:

Table 4: Output statistics for regression of the number of patent citations on lagged
funding.

These results indicate that there is little direct correlation between NASA R&D funding
from 1959 to 1975 and future patent grants. Similarly, regressing the log number of
citations on lagged funding gives an insignificant result as well, summarized in table 6:

Table 5: Output statistics for regression of the log number of patent citations on lagged
funding.
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I next test the relationship between original patents and future patents, regressing
the number of citations on the number of original NASA patents, with results
summarized in table 7:

Table 6: Output statistics for regression of the number of future patents on the number of
original NASA patents.

Unlike the regression using lagged funding, this regression produces a very significant
result—it implies that an increase of one NASA patent produces an additional 10.8 future
patents. This result indicates that federal R&D funding does not interact directly with
future patents, but that the patents produced by the federal government do. An R-squared
of 0.91 reinforces this notion. So, while the impact of federal R&D funding might not be
direct, it is certainly significant.
Regressing the log number of patent citations on original NASA patents yields
similarly significant results, summarized in table 8:

Table 7: Output statistics for regression of the log number of patent citations on the
number of original NASA patents.

This regression indicates that one additional NASA patent yields a 2.3% increase in
future patent citations. This reinforces the notion that federal R&D funding interacts with,
and increases, future citations through the increase of original patents.
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Completing the same regression using an IV strategy (with lagged funding as the
instrument) yields a similar coefficient but without the same statistical certainty:

Table 8: Output statistics for IV regression of the number of future patents on the number
of original NASA patents, using lagged funding as an instrument.

The coefficient increases from 10.8 to 13.4; the IV regression shows an even larger
impact of NASA patents on future patents than the OLS regression. That said, the
standard error increases significantly as well, and the 95% confidence interval widens to
include negative coefficients. Given the lack of confidence produced by the IV
estimation, the relationship between NASA patent grants and future patent grants might
be more endogenous than originally thought.
Despite this result, the overall conclusion of these regressions seems to be one
that indicates a positive correlation—as NASA R&D funding increased, NASA patents
increased as well, and as NASA patents increased, so did future patents. The simple
conclusion from this paints a positive picture for federal R&D. Not only did that
government spending produce initial innovation (in the form of NASA patents), it also
promoted future innovation that largely benefited the private sector. This said, the full
picture of federal R&D is incomplete without comparative data from private sector
patents.
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VIII. Robustness
a.

Omitted Variables
As is the case in almost any regression estimation, omitting significant variables

can bias the estimation and lead to misleading conclusions. In my original regression, I
test only the relationship between patents, citations, and funding—there are likely a
number of other factors which influence these variables.
Adding three additional variables to my dataset (GDP growth rate, civilian
unemployment rate, and the number of Americans over the age of 25 with a college
degree) I rerun my regression, with results summarized in table 10:

Table 9: Output statistics for regression of NASA patents on funding (lagged four years),
GDP growth rate, unemployment, and the number of individuals over the age of 25 with
a college degree.

In this regression, not only does the coefficient on lagged funding remain nearly
unchanged (0.085 in the original regression to 0.083 in this regression), but all three
coefficients for the additional variables are not statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level. This result indicates that while omitted variable bias may be present,
the addition of multiple, anecdotally significant variables, does not change the outcome.
Thus, the original conclusions regarding NASA patents remains valid.
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b.

Autocorrelation
Autocorrelation describes a situation in which time series data is correlated with

itself in past and future time intervals; it is a common problem with any time series data
and can bias the standard errors, leading to inaccurate conclusions. Employing both the
Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Godfrey LM tests for autocorrelation, I can conclude that
my data does suffer from autocorrelation. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson statistic
indicates that the autocorrelation is generally positive.
Using a Prais—Winsten Cochrane—Orcutt estimation to correct for the
autocorrelation, I find the following regression results:

Table 10: Output for a Prais—Winsten Cochrane—Orcutt regression of NASA patents
on funding (lagged), GDP growth, unemployment, and the number of individuals over
the age of 25 with a college degree.

Using these corrections for autocorrelation changes the coefficient on lagged funding by
only a small amount, from 0.083 to 0.085. Additionally, the remaining three variables
remain statistically insignificant using a 95% confidence threshold. These results imply
the while autocorrelation does exist in the data, it was not significant enough to alter the
results in a meaningful way.
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IX. Conclusions
Through the analysis of trends and patterns as well as various regressions, this NASA
event study offers insight into the question of what impact federal R&D spending has on
patent registration and future innovation. Although a causal relationship is difficult to
prove given the complexity of factors involved, I have exploited a unique, sudden
increase in R&D funding to illustrate the causal effect of R&D spending on innovation,
as measured by patents. My results provide empirical evidence that increases in federal
R&D lead to increases in both patent grants and future patents.
NASA’s nearly 2,000 patents granted between 1959 and 1975 are at least partially
responsible for nearly 20,000 future patents—an anecdotal survey shows that these later
patents contain some of the most fundamental technologies of the 21st century, including
advances in aerospace, electronics, telecommunications, and chemistry. Without the
federal investment in NASA from 1959 to 1975, it is entirely plausible to assume that we
might not have discovered some or all of these nearly 20,000 technologies.
Future research should be done to not only expand the scope of this examination to
other federal agencies in other time periods, but should also seek to quantify the
economic impact of these federal patents. The U.S. aerospace industry, which owes much
of existence to federal R&D, is currently worth nearly $1 trillion8; computing the
economic value of federal patents and spillover effects in all sectors would assist in
evaluating the cost effectiveness of federal R&D and perhaps change our public policy
approach to federal R&D.

8

Aerospace Industries Association, “Financial Statistics” https://www.aiaaerospace.org/research-center/statistics/industry-data/
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Additional research should also be done to compare the “spillover effectiveness” of
public versus private patents. NASA patents from 1959 to 1975 are, on average, cited
11.3 times in future patents; comparing and contrasting this figure with citation data from
a comparative sample of private patents would illustrate the effectiveness of these two
types of innovation at spurring future technology.
Ultimately, this NASA event study—while admittedly limited in scope—provides
valuable insight that can be applied to questions of public policy. The federal government
is not only in a unique position to overcome the high fixed costs of R&D, but can also
effectively spur growth and innovation through its research.
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